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I INTRODUCTION 
The major goals of the international research gmup "Psy-
chology of Mathematics Education" (PME) are to promote 
international contacts and exchanges of scientific information 
in the psychology of mathematics education, and to pmmote 
and stimulate interdisciplinary research in this field [Nesher 
and Kilpatrick, 1990]. In this context the relevance of pieces 
of research dealing with didactical phenomena is not clear 
From my experience as a member of PME since its birth in 
1976, I can witness to the fact that that we are very often 
embarrassed by the status to be given to research projects deal-
ing with classrooms and didactical processes Beyond academ-
ic considerations of the quality of such research projects, their 
relevance with respect to psychology as a discipline is always 
problematic It is this problem that I would like to consider here 
in so far as I consider it essential fOr om research community, 
and, more generally, for the development of relationships 
between research in mathematics education and research in 
psychology 
As a starting point I will consider one of the basic hypotheses 
of research in mathematics education: the constructivist 
hypothesis "Hypothese d'un sujet qui explore activement son 
environnement, qui participe activement a Ia creation de 
l'espace, du temps, de la causalite" [Inbelder and Caprona, 
1985, p 8] This hypothesis has been, and is still, largely dis-
cussed in the group I would like to consider it again to show 
how it calls for a step beyond a psychological problematique 
in order to understand the nature of the complexity of 
mathematics learning in a didactical context 
The starting point for the developmental process according 
to the constructivist hypothesis is the experience of a 
contradiction which is likely to provoke a cognitive dis-
equilibrium: it is the overcoming of such a contradiction which 
results in new constructions [Piaget, 1975] This process con-
cerns the learner as an individual As a result she will have her 
own understanding of some piece of knowledge But this could 
turn into a problem since this understanding must be open to 
exchange and collaboration with others This difficulty can be 
overcome only once the student's understanding "has been dis-
cussed and checked by others," as Sinclair [1988] quoting 
Piaget [1965] reminds us Actually, this social dimension is 
always present in the mathematics classroom in so far as all the 
way along the teaching process the learner interacts with other 
students and with the teacher. My position is that the relevance 
of our psychological approach depends on our capacity to inte-
grate this social dimension into ourproblbnatique 
More precisely, the psychological relevance of the social 
dimension lies in two characteristics of mathematics learning 
in a didactical context: 
(i) Students have to learn mathematics as social 
knowledge; they are not free to choose the meanings they 
construct. These meanings must not only be efficient in 
solving problems but they must also be coherent with 
those socially recognized This condition is necessary for 
the future participation of students as adults in social 
activities 
(ii) After the first few steps, mathematics can no longer 
be learned by means of interaction with a physical 
environment but requires the confrontation of the stu-
dent's cognitive model with that of other students, or of 
the teacher, in the context of a given mathematical activ-
ity Especially when dealing with refutations, the 
relevance of its resolution is what is at stake in the con-
huntation between two students' understandings of a 
problem and its mathematical content 
The consequence of the recognition of the crucial role played 
by these two characteristics is that we have to take the study of 
didactical phenomena as a paradigm of psychological research 
in mathematics education. 
To support this position I will take the results ofthe research 
I have made on teaching and learning problems of mathemat-
ical proof [Balacheff, 1988a] In particular I have studied the 
complexity of students' treatment of refutation within the con-
text of solving a given mathematical problem I have then con-
sidered the same question in a didactical context In both cases 
my analysis focussed on the respective contributions ofthe cog-
nitive and social dimensions in the determination of the 
phenomena observed 
II THE PROBLEM OF CONTRADICTION 
II 1 Awareness and treatment 
of a contradiction 
Following Grize [1983] I consider that a contradiction exists 
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only if it has a witness. That means that a contradiction does 
not exist by itself but only with reference to a cognitive system 
A contradiction may be recognised by the teacher in a student's 
solution to a problem but ignored by the students On the other 
hand, a contradiction may exist for the learner where none 
exists for the teacher. In both cases, the fact that a contradic-
tion is elicited or not depends basically on the knowledge of the 
one who claims that a contradiction exists or does not 
According to Piaget [1974, p 161] the awareness of a con-
tradiction is only possible at the level at which the subject 
becomes able to overcome it Actually, to become aware of a 
contradiction means to become able to raise the question of the 
choice between two propositions: an assertion and its negation 
Whatever the choice, it implies that the formulation of the 
assertion is available and that the subject can construct and 
express its negation Thus consciousness of a contradiction 
depends on two constructions, and the subject can only be 
aware of the contradiction when he becomes able to cany out 
these two constructions Indeed, even when a contradiction has 
been identified, overcoming it may only be possible after a long 
process 
On the other hand, a contradiction exists only with reference 
to a disappointed expectation, or with reference to a refuted 
conjecture The potential existence of an assertion is not suffi-
cient, to use a metaphor of Taine 1: it is necessary for it to come 
to the forefront of the scene. Piaget himself remarks that to 
become aware of a contradiction is far easier when it appears 
between an expectation and an external event which contradicts 
it [ibid]. The existence of such an expectation means that the 
subject is actually committed to an assertion and is able to side-
step its action In other words, she is able to consider it as a pos-
sible object ofthinking; even more, as an object of discourse 
At this point action is no longer just carried out Being the 
product of a choice, it is considered in terms of its validity and 
the adequacy of its effect That is to say, action is then related 
to an aim, and a contradiction becomes apparent when this aim 
is not fulfilled I he choice which has been made and the con-
ditions under which the action has been performed are then put 
in doubt. 
I would like, then, to state the following conditions as being 
necessary conditions fOr the emergence of the awareness of a 
contradiction: 
(i) The existence of an expectation or an anticipation 
(ii) The possibility of constructing and formulating an as ser-
tion related to this expectation, and the possibility of stating 
its negation 
In mathematics counterexamples are the critical indications 
of the possible existence of a contradiction Taking as a basis 
the model proposed by Lakatos [1976], we can differentiate the 
implications of a counterexample depending on whether what 
is considered is the conjecture, its proof2, or the related 
knowledge and the rationality of the problem-solver himself 
The schema' (Figure 1), showing a conjecture and its proofas 
the product of both the knowledge and the rationality of a sub-
ject, outlines the main possible consequences of a counter-
example. Of course the conjecture may be rejected, but other 
issues are possible, for example: to inspect the proof carefully 
in order to elicit a possible lemma and then to incorporate it as 
a condition in the statement of the conjecture; or to question 
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the rationale of the proof or the underlying knowledge; or even 
to dismiss the counterexample as a ''monster'' Also- and it 
is what we expect in so far as we are concerned about learning 
- such a process is likely to provoke an evolution of the 
knowledge related to the proof' 
The analysis Lakatos [1976] provides of the development of 
mathernatical"lmowledge leaves out a question that is essential 
for the teacher and the educational researcher: what determines 
the relevance of a particular choice for overcoming the con-
tradiction brought forth by a counterexample? It is this ques-
tion that I have investigated by means of an experimental study 
that I will now brief! y outline 
II .2.. Students' treatment of 
a counterexample 
II.2.L The experimental setting 
In order to explore students' behavior when faced with a coun-
terexample, I have used a situation involving social interactions 
which encouraged the confrontation of different viewpoints 
about the solution of the problem and, hence, a verbal ex-
change making explicit the possible refutations and how to deal 
with them, thus showing the proving process underlying the 
solutions proposed by the students, Pairs of 13-14 year-old stu-
dents were required to solve the following problem': 
Give a way ofcalculating the number of diagonals of a 
polygon once the number of its vertices is known 
The answer to this question was to be expressed in a message 
addressed to and to be used by other 13-14 year-old students, 
The invoked communication structures the student pairs' 
activity, and more particularly it solicits a verbal formulation 
of the counting procedure This is something that students do 
not normally do straightaway even if they are technically capa-
ble of it At the same time the desire to supply the "other13-14 
year-old students" with a reliable technique is likely to make 
the student pairs pay more attention to its formulation Lastly, 
the two students have access to as much paper as they want but, 
on the other hand, to only one pencil. This constraint reinforces 
the cooperative nature of the situation while at the same time 
giving us more direct access to the dynamic of the two con-
fronted knowledge systems, especially in the case of decision 
making, 
The observer intervenes only after the students have claimed 
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that they have produced a final solution At this stage he aban-
dons his stance of neutrality and asks the students to deal with 
the counterexamples that he offers Thus there are two differ-
ent phases during the observation, one quasi-independent of 
the observer and the other with a strong observer-student 
interaction 
11.2.2.Students' solutions and 
their foundation 
The observed problem-solving procedures are closely linked 
to the meaning students give to the "objects" polygon and 
diagonal. Particular, the interpretation regular polygon for 
"polygon", and diameter for "diagonal" leads students to the 
conjecturef(n) =n/26 Three types ofsolution have been pro-
posed which "effectively" provide the required number of 
diagonals . They are: 
f(n) =f(n-1) +(n-2) 
f(n)=(n-3)+(n-3)+(n-4)+ .+2+1 
j(n) =(n .(n-3))/2 
Indeed, these are not the ways students expressed them but dis-
play their form 
The rational bases fOr these conjectures are more often 
than not empirical But even so, the nature of the underlying 
proving process can vary considerably flum one solution 
to another Naive empiricism and generic examples are 
dominant7 
The analysis of the students' dialogue shows that the lack of 
an operative linguistic means is one of the majm reasons fOr 
the absence of proofs at a higher level. For example, the use 
of a generic example indicates the willingness of the students 
to establish their solution in all its generality, but this willing-
ness is hampered by the absence of an efficient linguistic tool 
to express the objects involved in the problem-solving process 
and their relationships 
I must emphasize that this complexity is not only 
linguistic but also has cognitive origins: that is, the 
complexity of the recognition and the elicitation of the 
concepts needed for the proof Linguistic constructions 
and cognitive constructions are dialectically related during 
the problem-solving process Let us take the example of 
j(n)=(n- 3) +(n- 3)+(n-4)+. +2+ 1 In this case students 
have to express an iterative pmcess and to control it (number 
of steps, completion of the computation), but at theirlevel of 
schooling they do not have the necessary conceptual tools To 
them, the use of a generic example seems the best means to 
''show'' the computation procedure and to justify it 
Some of the students mention the need for a mathematical 
proof but they do not try to produce one In fact they stay at a 
level ofproving which is consistent, on the one hand, with their 
level of uncertainty and what they think is required by the situ-
ational context, and on the other hand, with the cognitive and 
linguistic constructions they are able to perform [Fischbein, 
1982; Balacheff, 1987b] 
IL2.3.The treatment of counterexamples 
Most types of treatment of a refutation, as mentioned above 
(Figure 1), have been observed But we have to make a distinc-
tion between treatments which follow an analysis on the part 
of the problem-solver and those which are merely ad hoc treat-
ments of the conjecture in order to save it at all costs 
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Important differences exist between "phase I" and "phase 
II'', but these differences are not the ones one could possibly 
foresee a priori. It is in phase I that rejection of the conjecture 
is dominant, not in phase II where one migbt have expected that 
a counterexample proposed by the observer would provoke a 
rejection of the conjecture. On the other hand, rejection ofthe 
counterexample is dominant in phase II as well as its being 
treated as an exception .. Two explanations can be proposed fm 
this phenomenon: 
- 'I he rejection of the conjecture appears in cases of ex-
treme fragility which are verified in only one case: f(n)=n 
(verified by P5), f(n)=2.n (verified by P7), f(n)=n 2 (ver-
ified by no polygon, but conjectured by Hamdi and F abrice. ) . 
- The rejection of the counterexample happens when it 
is opposed by a strong conjecture whether or not the latter is 
strongly established (with respect to the conceptions of the stu-
dents) or correct 
In the following I will present in some detail the categories 
of students' treatment of a refutation 
Rejection of the conjecture 
The analysis of this type of response to a counterexample 
involves two different behaviors: 
- The immediate r~jection of the conjecture, as soon as 
the counterexample has been pmduced This decision is more 
often than not taken on the basis of naive empiricism This 
behavior is coherent in so far as the observation of a few poly-
gons was sufficient to construct the conjecture, one counter-
example is sufficient to dismiss it 
- The rejection of the conjecture afier an analysis of the 
possible origin of its refutation This analysis provides students 
with new elements which they can use to restart the search fOr 
a solution to the problem 
Modification of the conjecture 
The modification of the conjecture when faced with a refuta-
tion appears to be equally possible in both the phases of the 
experiment. Three main types of such a treatment can be 
distinguished: 
- An ad hoc modification which consists in a direct 
adaptation ofthe conjecture to superficial features, observed 
by the students, of the relations between the expected result and 
the one indicated by the counterexample The origin of the new 
conjecture is related to the observation of only one case, thus 
it has a naive empiricist foundation 
- A modification which follows an analysis of the 
sources of the refutation with reference to the foundation of the 
conjecture 
- A modification which consists in reducing the domain 
of validity of the initial conjecture to a set of objects which 
excludes the counterexample, and in constructing a solution 
specific to the objects the class of which the counterexample 
is considered a good representative 
The counterexample considered as an exception 
This type of treatment 0f a counterexample is quite rare It 
appears just once in the first phase of the experiment A pos-
sible explanation may be the belief that a mathematical 
assertion must not suffer any exception 
Introduction of·q condition 
The decision to introduce a condition in the statement of the 
conjecture follows two types of strategies: 
- Some students try to find a condition by means of an 
analysis of the counterexample in order to bear down on the 
class of objects of which it is a representative 
- Others try to find a condition by means of an analy-
sis of the refuted conjecture and its foundations But the 
decision to introduce it seems impermissible to some students 
because of the experimental contract8 
lhe definition revisited 
Most of the students posing the problem of what a polygon is, 
or trying to elicit a definition ofa polygon or of a diagonal, are 
those whose conjecture is f(n) =n/2 Their uncertainty about 
what a polygon is is noticeable from the very beginning of the 
experiment, but it is only after a refutation that some of them 
clearly state this problem of definition 
Rejection ofthe counterexample 
This way of treating a counterexample is the most widely dis-
tributed among the observations I have )l1ade. On the other 
hand its presence is more frequent in phase II of my experiment 
during which the students were perhaps more eager to defend 
their conjecture against refutation by the observer. But not all 
these reactions should be considered the same. Three main 
categories can be differentiated: 
- The counterexample is rejected after an analysis 
which reveals that it actually does not refute the conjecture: it 
is shown that the refutation is made on the ground of a mis-
interpretation The possibility of such an analysis was opened 
up by the example of a polygon P 5 with three aligned (but not 
consecutive) vertices, proposed by the observer 
- The counterexample is r~jected with reference to a 
precise conception of what a polygon is: a conception which 
may have been previously formulated as a definition 
- The last category is the one Lakatos named "monster-
baning" The counterexample is in this case rejected by stu-
dents without any further consideration of the definition or any 
debate about their conceptions. It is, in particular, the category 
for the triangle because of its lack of diagonals 
IL3 .. Some conclusions on students' 
treatment of refutations 
What the Lakatos model [1976] describes is the complexity of 
overcoming contradictions in mathematics due to the diversi-
ty of possible ways of dealing with a refutation For students 
also the voies royales du progres do not exist. They have at 
hand more than one way to cope with a contradiction, but some 
of the possible ways they can choose may not be acceptable 
with respect to the teaching target 
From our research, three factors appear to determine stu-
dents' choice in their treatment of a refutation: 
Analysis with reference to the problem itse/j 
It gives a central place to discussion of the nature ofthe objects 
concerned, and thus on their definition This analysis poten-
tially leads to any type of treatment which could be considered 
suitable, none of them privileged a priori The choice the 
students make can be understood only in the light of a local 
analysis or ofthe specific character and knowledge of each of 
the individuals The type oftreatment can change in the courEe 
of the problem-solving process: modification of the definition 
followed by the introduction of a condition or a modification 
of the initial conjecture when the conceptions have been stabi-
lized The origins of the choice between the introduction ofa 
condition and the search for a specific solution, and the modifi-
cation of the conjecture, cannot be traced in the data gathered 
What can be conjectured is that when the refutation might brush 
aside a wide range of objects (with respect to the students' con-
ceptions), then a modification of the conjecture is decided 
which consists in a specific solution. 
Analysis with reference to a global conception of mathematics 
This could be a serious obstacle to some of the treatments of 
a refutation: refusal to treat the counterexample as an 
exception, refusal to accept a solution which cannot be 
expressed by a unique formula, etc. This global conception of 
mathematics has its origins mainly in the interactions between 
the teacher and her students We can speak of the emergence 
of a didactical epistemology of mathematics as the result of the 
everyday practice of the classroom micro-society. Recogniz-
ing this, Lampert [1988, p .. 470] reports that "changing stu-
dents' ideas about what it means to know and do mathematics 
was a matter of immersing them in a social situation that 
worked according to different rules than those that ordinarily 
pertain in classroom, and then respectfully challenging their 
assumptions about what knowing mathematics entails'' Such 
a project is at the core of many attempts to modify classroom 
practices in order to obtain a modification of students' view 
about what mathematics consists of [e.g . Arsac et Mante, 1983; 
Capponi, 1986]. Shoenfe!d [1987], exploring the issue of 
mathematics as ''sense-making'', shows that these kinds of 
social considerations are not recent, citing for example class-
room discussions promoted by Fawcert [1983]. What is new 
now seems to be the consensus of the mathematics educators' 
community about the fact that issues related to the social 
dimension must be considered more carefully Evidence of the 
fruitfulness of using social settings to facilitate mathematics 
learning consists mainly of stories about the success of such 
attempts But, as we know, such settings do not work with 
every teacher or in every classroom Research is needed to 
strengthen the foundation of such approaches 
Analysis with reference to the situation 
What is in question is mainly the way students view (or 
"read") the situation which leads them to fiwour some specific 
treatments of the counterexample (a definition game, a riddle 
game in which they abandon their solution quite easily) or 
which constitutes an obstacle to others (the refusal to introduce 
a condition because it has not been stated in the problem state-
ment) The students' view of the situation is mainly a conse-
quence of what has been stated about the characteristics ofthe 
situation, but also of what they think about it and which has 
never been stated explicitly. The idea of an ''experimental con-
tract'' tries to catch this phenomenon by referring to a negoti-
ation, more often than not implicit, which defines the situation 
for the Ieamer and which contributes to giving meaning to its 
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behavior The theoretical concept of "didactical contract", 
coined by Brousseau [1986], is a tool to use in coping with this 
phenomenon, which plays an essential role in the mathemat-
ics classroom. Its importance lies in the fact that it can affect 
students' construction of meaning in so far as "les sujets en 
viennent toujours a elaborer des connaissances propres a la 
situation" [Inhelder and Cap rona, 1985, p 15] This remark 
has some implications for our research methodologies since om 
interpretations of observed students' behaviors might be rele-
vant, or valid, only if we can say what was the game they were 
playing 
III DEALING WITH CONTRADICTIONS 
IN THE MATHEMATICS CLASSROOM 
To base the learning of mathematics on the students' becom-
ing aware of a contradiction requires that we take into account 
the uncertainty about the ways they might find to overcome the 
contradiction. If, as I believe, we cannot assume that there is 
strict determinism in cognitive development, what can be the 
extent of the role played by a particular situation? Rather, the 
teacher's interventions will be fundamental The way she 
manages the teaching situation may bring the students to see 
that their knowledge and the rationality of their conjectures 
must be questioned and perhaps modified because no ad hoc 
adaptation of a particular solution, or its radical rejection, can 
by itself lead to a conceptual advance 
Mathematicians, Lakatos considers, share almost the same 
rational background In the case of students the background is 
not the same: naive empiricism, or pragmatic validations, can 
be the basis for their proofs and can constitute the roots of their 
beliefs in the truth of a statement How can we escape the fact 
that when faced with a counterexample produced by the 
teacher, students claim that it is only a particular case when, 
in fact, what they should question is the naive empiricism on 
which their conjecture is based? At a higher level of schooling 
this problem can still appear: a student may be discussing the 
legitimacy of a counterexample when it is his or her under-
standing of the related mathematical knowledge that should be 
being questioned 
On the other hand, in the teaching situation, the existence of 
a referent knowledge (the scientific knowledge or the 
knowledge to be taught) constrains the teacher to decide 
whether a fact is contradictory or not with respect to this 
knowledge The problem for her, then, is to make the student 
recognise this contradiction that she alone initially sees 
The didactical question thus becomes two-fold: first, what 
are the conditions necess-ary to engender~ on the patt of the stu-
dent, awareness ofa contradiction? And, second, what are the 
conditiom under which the student can re.solve it properly? 
Actually, these are genuine psychological questions 
addressed to our community To tackle them we need to go 
beyond a classical cognitive problematic and to take into 
account both the complexity of the didactical situation and the 
specificity of mathematics as a content to be learned. Follow-
ing this path, the work I have done confirms the benefit of 
social interaction as a didactical tool, but it also clarifies its 
limits in helping students to make sense of mathematical 
knowledge [Balacheff, 1989b] 
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!It L Social versus mathematical behaviors 
Mathematical behaviors are not the only ones likely to appear 
in social situations, and in some circumstances they can even 
be almost completely replaced by other types of interactional 
behavior My point is that social interaction might become an 
obstacle when students are eager to succeed, or when they are 
not able to coordinate their different points of view, or when 
they are not able to overcome their conflict on a scientific 
basis9 In particular these situations can favour nai·ve 
empiricism, or they can justifY the use of a crucial experiment 
in order to obtain an agreement, instead of proofs at a higher 
level [Balacheff, 1988a] 
Some people may suggest that a better didacticiu engineer-
ing would allow us to overcome these difficulties; indeed, 
much progress can be made in this direction and more research 
is needed. But I would like to suggest that "argumentative 
behaviors'' (i) are always potentially present in human inter-
action, and (ii) that they are genuine epistemological 
obstacles 10 to the learning of mathematics By ''argumentative 
behaviors'' I mean behaviors by which somebody tries to ob-
tain from somebody else an agreement to the validity of a given 
assertion, by means of various arguments or representations 
[Oleron, 1984] In this sense, argumentation is likely to appear 
in any social interaction aimed at establishing the truth or false-
hood of something . But we do consider that argumentation and 
mathematical explanation are not of the same nature: the aim 
of argumentation is to obtain the agreement of the partner in 
the interaction but not in the first place to establish the truth of 
some statement. As a social behavior it is an open process, in 
other words it allows the use of any kind of means; whereas, 
in mathematics, we have to accept the requirement that the use 
of knowledge must fit into a common body of knowledge on 
which people (mathematicians) agree As an outcome of 
argumentation solutions to problems are proposed but nothing 
is ever definitive [Perelman, 1970, p 41]. 
In so far as students are concerned we have observed that 
argumentative behaviors play a major role, pushing back other 
behaviors like the ones we were aiming at Clearly enough this 
can be explained by the fact that such behaviors pertain to the 
genesis of a child's development in logic: children very early 
experience the efficiency of argumentation in social inter-
actions with other children, or with adults (in particular with 
parents) So it is quite natural for these behaviors to appear first 
when what is in debate is the validity of some production, even 
a mathematical one 
What might be questioned is perhaps not so much the stu-
dents' rationality as a whole, but the relationships between the 
rationale of their behaviors and the characteristics of the situ-
ations in which they are involved Not surprisingly students 
first refer to the kind of interaction they are already familiar 
with; argumentation has its own domain of validity and ofoper-
ationality as all of us know 
So, in order to teach mathematics successfully the major 
problem appears to be that of negotiating the acceptance by stu-
dents of new rules, but not necessarily to obtain their rejection 
of argurnentation in so far as it is perhaps well adapted to other 
contexts In particular, mathematical proof should be displayed 
''against'' argumentation, bringing students to the awareness 
of its specificity and its efficiency in solving the kind of 
problems we have to solve in mathematics. 
Negotiation is the key process here, for the following 
reasons: 
- First, because the teaching situation cannot be deli-
vered entirely ''open'' to the students otherwise many of them 
will not understand the point and will get lost. The following 
quotation from Cooney [1985, p. 332] makes it clear: "Maybe 
not all of them but at least some of them felt ''I am not going 
to participate in this class because you [referring to the teacher] 
are just wasting my time''. It is so ironic because ifl was doing 
the type of thing they wanted me to do, they would be tuming 
around in their seats and talking" Where Cooney sees a "no-
win situation'', Brousseau [1986, p 119-120] suggests theoriz-
ing a phenomenon specific to didactical situations: the ''para-
dox of the devolution of situations" That is, all that the teacher 
undertakes in orderto obtain the expected pupil behavior tends 
to deprive this behavior of its mathematical meaning; but on 
the other hand, if the pupil refuses information coming from 
the teacher then the didactic relationship is broken 
- Second, because of the rules to be followed the true 
aim of the teacher cannot be stated explicitly If the rules for 
the interaction are explicitly stated then some students will try 
to escape them, orto discuss them just as many people do with 
a legal point And because interacting mathematically might 
then become "mastering a few clever techniques" which 
would turn into objects to be taught, just as teaching ''problem 
solving" has often become teaching quasi-algorithmic pro-
cedures [Schoenfeld, 1985] 
111.2.. Efficiency versus rigor 
Even if we are able to set up a situation whose characteristics 
promote content -specific interaction with the students, we can-
not take for granted that they will engage in "mathematical 
debate" and that finally they will act mathematically. 
A particularity of mathematics is the kind of knowledge it 
aims at producing Its main concem is with concepts specific 
to its internal development. There is evidence that Egyptians 
used intellectual tools in practical situations for which we now 
have mathematical descriptions, but the birth of mathematical 
proof is essentially the result of the willingness of some 
philosophers to reject mere observation and pragmatism, to 
break off perception (le monde sensible), to base knowledge 
and truth on Reason. This was an evolution, or a revolution, 
of mathematics as a tool - encapsulated in practice - into 
mathematics as an object made available by itself- through 
a constructive process- for the pmpose of explicit consider-
ations, that as a consequence brought a change of focus from 
"efficiency" towards "rigor" 
It is a rupture of the same kind that takes place between 
"practical geometry" (where students draw and observe) and 
"deductive geometry" (where students have to establish 
theorems deductively) In numerical activities, like the one 
reported by Lampert [1988], the same rupture happens when 
students no longer have to find some pattern out of the 
observation of numbers but have to establish numerical proper-
ties in their "full" generality (using letters and elementary 
algebra) 
We have here to realize that most of the time students do not 
act as theoreticians but as practical men Their task is to give 
a solution to the problem the teacher has given to them, a 
solution that will be acceptable with respect to the classroom 
situation In such a context the most important thing is to be 
effective The problem of the practical man is to be efficient not 
to be rigorous. It is to produce a solution not to produce 
knowledge Thus the problem solver does not feel the need to 
call for more logic than is necessary in practice 
That means that beyond the social characteristics of the 
teaching situation we must analyse the nature of the target it 
aims at. If students see the target as ''doing'' more than 
"knowing", then their debate will focus more on efficiency 
and reliability than on rigor and certainty Thus again, 
argumentative behaviors could be viewed as being more '' eco-
nomic" than behaving mathematically, while allowing stu-
dents to feel good enough about the fact that they have 
completed the task 
To all these problems I see possible ways of solution in the 
study and the better understanding of the phenomena related 
to the didactical contract, the condition of its negotiation 
(which is almost essentially implicit) and the nature of its out-
comes: the devolution oflearning responsibility to the students. 
We cannot expect ''ready-to-wear'' teaching situations but it 
is reasonable to think that the development of research will 
make available some knowledge which will enable teachers to 
face the difficult didactical problem of managing the life of this 
original cognitive society: the mathematics classroom 
Notes 
[I] Quoted by Hadamard [1959, p 34] 
[2] By ''proof · we mean a discourse whose aim is to establish the truth of 
a conjecture (in French: preuve) not necessarily a mathematical proof (in 
French: dimonstration) 
[3] Indeed such a schema just sketches the range of possible consequences, 
but it is sufficient to give an idea of what we call the openness of the possible 
ways to treat a refutation. 
[41 What Lakatos called a proof-generated concept [Lakatos, 1976 p 88 
seq]. 
[5] Observations, which began in 1981, were carried out mainly during the 
first semester of 1982. Fourteen pairs were observed for 80-120 minutes. For 
a complete report on this research see [Balacheff l988a] or [Balacheff. 1989a] 
for a detailed report in English 
[6] ''f'' is the name we will use for the function which relates the number 
n of vertices of a polygon to the number of its diagonals 
[7] By nai"ve empiricism we mean the situation in which the problem-solver 
draws the conjecture from the observation of a small number of cases (fOr 
examplethatfln)=n because P 5 has 5 diagonals). We use the expression cru-
cial experiment when the problem-solver verifies the conjecture on an instance 
which "doesn't come for free"; here the problem of generality is explicitly 
posed The generic example involves making explicit the reasons for the truth 
of the conjecture by means of actions on an object which is not there in its own 
right but as a characteristic representative of its class The thought t'xperiment 
invokes action by intemalising it and detaching it from a particular represen-
tation (Fora precise definition of the different types of proofS. see: Balacheff 
[1987a), [1988a] and [1989al ) 
[8] The relationships between the actors involved in the situation (the two 
pupils and the observer) are determined by rules which are both explicit (like 
what is said about the task) and implicit (like those suggested by the aim of 
the experiment) All these rules constitute what we call the ' ·experimental con-
tract'' [Balacheff and Laborde, 1985] 
[9J I mean, a content-specific basis 
[lO] The notion of "'epistemological obstacle was coined by Bachelard 
[1938], and then pushed to the fOrefront of the didactical scene by Brousseau 
[1983] It refers to a genuine piece of knowledge which resists the construc-
tion of a new one, but such that the overcoming of this resistance is part of a 
full understanding of the new knowledge 
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